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A WHIFF OF THINGS TO COME:
THE UNREASONABLENESS OF DOG
SNIFFS IN ILLINOIS V. CABALLES
I. INTRODUCTION
Another morning, another day at work, another commute. Or so
he thought. On Tuesday morning, Michael Smith' sat down for
breakfast, gathered his briefcase, and kissed his children goodbye
before starting his commute to work. Running ten minutes behind
schedule, Michael rushed downtown driving 75 miles per hour on a
65 mile per hour freeway. Though disappointed, Michael could not
feign surprise when a Highway Patrol officer pulled him over for
what Michael could only assume was his speeding. However, soon
after, another officer arrived at the scene with a large dog and began
making his way around Michael's car. That Tuesday morning, what
began as an ordinary commute for Michael quickly turned into an
event that shattered his sense of security and any belief he might
have held in a constitutional right to privacy.
On January 24, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Illinois v.
Caballes,2 concluding that a dog sniff that is conducted during a
lawful traffic stop does not implicate the Fourth Amendment where it
reveals no information other than the location of an illegal
substance. 3  The Court determined that the use of a narcotics-
detecting dog to sniff around the outside of a vehicle does not
constitute a cognizable infringement on the driver's Fourth
Amendment rights.4 In the process, the Court overturned the
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court.5
This Case Comment will begin by discussing the factual and
1. This character and story are creations of the author and are not intended
to depict any real person or case.
2. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
3. Id. at 409.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 410.
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procedural history of Caballes. Next, it will summarize the Court's
decision and reasoning. This Comment will then analyze the Court's
decision. It will argue that the Court erred in not applying the test set
forth in Terry v. Ohio,6 which determines whether searches and
seizures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, this
Comment will conclude that the Court's flawed reasoning in
Caballes risks undercutting the privacy protections intended for our
nation's citizens by the framers of the Constitution.
II. CASE BACKGROUND
On November 12, 1998, Illinois State Trooper Daniel Gillette
stopped Roy Caballes on the highway for driving 71 miles per hour
in a 65 mile per hour zone.7 When Gillette radioed the police
dispatcher to report the stop, State Trooper Craig Graham overheard
the transmission. 8 Graham, a member of the Illinois State Police
Drug Interdiction Team, announced that he would report to the scene
to conduct a canine sniff for narcotics. 9  Meanwhile, Gillette
approached Caballes' car, informed him that he was speeding, and
requested Caballes' driver's license, registration, and proof of
insurance.
10
Gillette testified that as he was speaking to Caballes, he noticed
a map on the front passenger seat, an open ashtray, two suits hanging
in the back seat, and the smell of air freshener. He also noted that
there were no visible signs of luggage.1' Gillette instructed Caballes
to pull his car off to the shoulder and to come to the squad car since
it was raining. 12 He then told Caballes that he would only write a
warning ticket for the speeding violation.' 3 Gillette called the police
dispatcher to ascertain the validity of Caballes' license and to check
for outstanding warrants.1 4  While waiting for the results of his
request, Gillette asked Caballes about his destination and why he was
6. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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"dressed up."' 5 Caballes responded that he was moving to Chicago
and attributed his attire to his job as a salesman. 16 According to
Gillette, Caballes acted unusually nervous despite facing a mere
warning ticket. 17
Upon receiving notice from the dispatcher that Caballes' license
was valid, Gillette requested Caballes' criminal history.' 8 He also
sought permission to search the vehicle, which Caballes denied.' 9
When Gillette then asked Caballes if he had ever been arrested,
Caballes replied that he had not.
20
However, the dispatcher reported soon thereafter that Caballes
21had two prior arrests for distribution of marijuana. While Caballes
waited in the squad car, Gillette proceeded to write the warning
ticket.22 While Gillette was writing the citation, Graham arrived with
23a drug-detection dog and began a sniff of Caballes' vehicle. Within
a minute, the dog alerted at the trunk of the car.24 Gillette's
subsequent search of the trunk revealed marijuana, and the two
officers arrested Caballes.25 The entire incident took less than ten
minutes.
26
Caballes was charged with one count of cannabis trafficking in
violation of the Illinois Cannabis Control Act.27 Caballes filed a
motion to suppress the marijuana found in the trunk and to quash his
arrest. 28 However, the trial court denied the motion, concluding that
Officers Gillette and Graham had not unnecessarily prolonged the








22. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406.
23. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 203.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406.
27. People v. Caballes, N.E.2d at 203 (citing Cannabis Control Act, 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 550/5. 1(a) (West 1998)).
28. Id.
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provide the requisite probable cause for opening Caballes' trunk.29
The appellate court affirmed this decision, holding that the officers
did not need reasonable articulable suspicion in order to conduct the
dog sniff.30 That court also held that although the criminal history
check prolonged Caballes' detention, the delay was de minimis.
3 1
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, reversed.32 It acknowledged
that the initial traffic stop was undisputedly proper, but nevertheless
held that the police officers "impermissibly broadened the scope of
the traffic stop... into a drug investigation" when they conducted
the canine sniff without any "specific and articulable facts" to
suggest drug activity.
33
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide "[w]hether
the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to
justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a
legitimate traffic stop."34  In a six-to-two decision 35 written by
Justice Stevens, the Court held that a dog sniff does not violate the
Fourth Amendment where it is conducted during a lawful traffic stop
and reveals no information other than the location of an illegal
substance.
36
III. REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT
A. Valid Fourth Amendment Seizure
In concluding that the canine sniff did not infringe upon
Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights, the Court began its analysis by
recognizing that the initial seizure of Caballes was lawful. 37 Officer
Gillette initiated the traffic stop when he observed Caballes violating
29. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
30. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 203-04.
31. Id. at204.
32. Id. at 205.
33. Id. at 204 (citing People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 2002)).
34. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 (citing Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at i, Illinois v. Caballes, 541 U.S. 972 (2004) (No. 03-023), 2003
WL 23119168).
35. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the consideration of the
case. Id. at 410.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 407.
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the posted speed limit, and as such, his decision to pull Caballes over
was based upon probable cause. 38 At the same time, the Court noted
that a seizure that begins lawfully may nevertheless violate the
Fourth Amendment if the manner in which the officers carry out the
seizure unreasonably infringes upon an individual's constitutional
rights.39 For instance, when officers seize an individual for the sole
purpose of issuing a ticket, that seizure may become unlawful if the
officers detain the individual for a time period longer than is
reasonably necessary to complete that task.40 The Court referred to
People v. Cox,4 1 in which the Illinois Supreme Court stated that a
canine sniff that unreasonably prolonged a traffic stop gave rise to an
unconstitutional seizure.42 The U.S. Supreme Court distinguished
Caballes from Cox on the grounds that the officers had unlawfully
detained Cox. 43 The Caballes Court then adopted the state supreme
court's holding that the ordinary course of activities incident to a
traffic citation justified the duration of Caballes' stop.
44
B. No Legitimate Privacy Interest in Contraband
The U.S. Supreme Court repudiated the Illinois Supreme Court's
holding that the police officers unlawfully transformed a traffic stop
into a drug investigation by introducing a canine sniff.45 In doing so,
the Court reaffirmed its earlier decisions that contraband does not
merit the protection of the Fourth Amendment.46 The Court relied on
its decision in United States v. Jacobsen,47 in which it held that
governmental conduct does not amount to a search unless it infringes
upon a legitimate interest in privacy.48 Under that ruling, an interest
38. Id. at 408.
39. Id. at 407 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984)).
40. Id.
41. 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 2002).
42. Illinois v. Caballes, 541 U.S. at 407-08 (citing People v. Cox, 782
N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 2002)).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 408.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 408-09 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123
(1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
47. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
48. See Illinois v. Caballes, 541 U.S. at 408 (citing United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)).
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in possessing contraband was not considered legitimate for Fourth
Amendment purposes. 49 Consequently, the Court held in Jacobsen
that official conduct that merely reveals the possession of contraband
could not be considered a search.5 °
The Court likewise pointed to its holding in United States v.
Place51 to support its conclusion that a sniff by a drug-detecting dog
does not invade an individual's legitimate interest in privacy.52 In
Place, law enforcement agents took custody of the defendant's
luggage at an airport and subjected the bags to a "sniff test" using a
drug-detecting canine, subsequently revealing a large quantity of
cocaine. 53 The officers conducted the sniff after noticing discrep-
ancies on the defendant's luggage address tags, leading them to
suspect illegal drug activity.54 The Place Court concluded that the
dog sniff of the defendant's luggage did not constitute a "search"
warranting protection under the Fourth Amendment.55 The Court
reasoned that the canine sniff did not require officers to open the
luggage and was thus "less intrusive than a typical search.",56 It
therefore treated the canine sniff as sui generis, explaining that the
dog sniff disclosed limited information about the contents of the
luggage since it only indicated the presence or absence of drugs.
57
In contrast to the limited searches in Jacobsen and Place, the
Court discussed the broader search at issue in Kyllo v. United
States.58 In Kyllo, agents scanned a home using a thermal-imaging
49. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
707 (1983)).
50. Id. at 124.
51. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
52. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (citing United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983)).
53. Place, 462 U.S. at 698-99.
54. Id. at 698.
55. Id. at 707.
56. Id.
57. Id. Interestingly, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the seizure of
the defendant's luggage nevertheless violated the Fourth Amendment because
the ninety-minute seizure was unreasonably long. Id. at 709-10. The Court
therefore premised its holding on the duration of the seizure rather than any
intrusion on individual privacy interests. Id.
58. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (citing Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)).
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device in order to detect high-intensity lamps used for growing
marijuana, 59 an action that the Court concluded amounted to an
unlawful search. 60 The Court reasoned that while the device detected
illegal activity-the cultivation of marijuana-it was also capable of
detecting perfectly legal activity as well.61
Relying on the aforementioned decisions, the Court stated that
the dog sniff in the instant case did not compromise any privacy
interest that Caballes might have had in the contents of his trunk.6 2
The Caballes Court reaffirmed the distinction between the expec-
tations of privacy in lawful activities and unlawful activities,
characterizing only the former as legitimate. 63  Moreover, the
officers in the present case conducted the canine sniff during a lawful
traffic stop,64 and the procedure did not reveal any information other
than the location of marijuana-a contraband item.65 Consequently,
the Court concluded that any invasion of Caballes' privacy
expectations did "not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable
infringement" 66 and therefore was not a search.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Dog Sniff of Caballes' Trunk Constituted a Search
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 67  Courts have interpreted
Fourth Amendment "effects" as including automotive vehicles and
have accordingly scrutinized the reasonableness of searches and
59. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
60. Id. at 40.
61. For instance, the Court pointed out that the device could potentially
detect details such as when an individual was taking a bath or whether one had
left a light on. Id. at 38. The Court also found it significant that the agents
utilized the thermal-imaging device upon the outer limits of a home, an area
that the Court has generally afforded special protection. Id. at 40 (citing
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
62. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
63. Id. at 409-10.
64. See supra Part III.A.
65. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
66. Id. at 409.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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seizures of automobiles.68 It is important to note, however, that the
Constitution does not forbid all searches and seizures. Rather, only
those searches that are unreasonable implicate the Fourth
Amendment's protections.69
The Court in the instant case correctly adopted the Illinois
Supreme Court's conclusion that the officers had properly seized
Caballes. 70 Generally, a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes
occurs whenever a police officer approaches an individual and
restricts his liberty to walk away. 7' The Court has previously held
that a routine traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.72  By that definition, Officer Gillette
reasonably seized Caballes for speeding.73
However, while the Court may have properly classified the stop
as a seizure, it greatly erred in finding that the subsequent dog sniff
did not constitute a search that infringed upon legitimate privacy
interests. Not only are canine sniffs invasive, their accuracy is also
questionable. Moreover, one cannot justify their use under the
"normal enhancement" or "plain smell" theories. As such, the Court
incorrectly categorized the canine sniff of Caballes as a non-search.
1. A Drug-Detecting Dog Sniff is Invasive,
Intimidating, and May Produce False Positives
That an individual has no right to possess contraband, standing
alone, is difficult to dispute. According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
no search thus occurs where a dog that is only capable of detecting
contraband discovers narcotics. 74 Likewise, there is no search where
the dog does not detect contraband since it simply walked around the
car and failed to alert to anything.
68. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964); United States v. Maple, 348 F.3d
260, 261 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
69. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
70. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ill. 2003).
71. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
72. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-37 (1984); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
653 (1979).
73. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
74. Id. at 410.
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However, regardless of what a drug-detecting canine may or
may not find, introducing a dog into a person's presence is
undoubtedly invasive. 75 As Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissenting
opinion, drug-detecting dogs are intimidating animals. 76  In the
context of traffic stops, introducing the canines to the scene causes
the stop to become "broader, more adversarial, and (in at least some
cases) longer." 77 In addition, there is also the "embarrassment and
intimidation of being investigated, on a public thoroughfare, for
drugs. 78
Not only is the use of drug-sniffing dogs potentially accusatory
and humiliating, it also runs the risk of producing false positives. In
his dissent, Justice Souter elaborates on this issue, stating that a "dog
that alerts hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times. 79 He
points to studies that reveal error rates ranging from 12.5 percent to
60 percent, depending on the duration of the search.8 ° Perhaps a
number of false positives, when compared to the quantity of accurate
sniffs, does not seem that appalling. After all, police officers are
only human and make mistakes themselves as well. Moreover, a
canine's alert may provide the probable cause necessary to conduct a
search and thus serves an important purpose. 81 However, a false alert
can be quite offensive to the innocent victim. From that individual's
perspective, the intimidation, humiliation, and accusatory nature of a
canine sniff are likely multiplied.
The risk of false positives also undermines the Court's rationale
for concluding that a dog sniff does not qualify as a search. In
finding that the sniffs by well-trained drug-detection dogs in
Jacobsen and Place did not constitute Fourth Amendment searches,
the Court reasoned that the sniffs disclosed nothing more than the
75. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir.
2004) (McKay, J., dissenting) ("[D]rug dogs are not lap dogs. They typically
are large, and to many ordinary innocent people, fearsome animals.").
76. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. Id.; see also United States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d 499, 511 (1 1th Cir.
2003) (noting that almost 80 percent of all currency in circulation has drug
residue, to which drug-sniffing dogs will alert if the currency is carried in large
quantities).
81. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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presence or absence of narcotics and thereby revealed no other
"private" information. 82 Yet this logic assumes that the dog sniffs
are one-hundred percent accurate. In fact, the accuracy of canine
drug sniffs has often been called into question. 83 As Justice Souter
pointed out in dissent, even the most well-trained drug-detecting
canine is ultimately a fallible creature. 84 A dog sniff is thus the "first
step in a process that may disclose 'intimate details' without
revealing contraband" 85 and in this sense resembles the thermal-
imaging device in Kyllo. 86  Even false alerts lead to full-scale
searches and may consequently result in offensive and unjustifiable
invasions into one's privacy. 87  In light of the error rates, 88 it
becomes clear that dog sniffs may not be as benign as the Court
would have us believe.
2. A Narcotics-Detecting Dog
Does Not Qualify as a Normal Enhancement
One might argue that a drug-detecting canine is a mere
"enhancement" of the officer's senses. Courts have indicated that
government officials do not perform an impermissible Fourth
Amendment search by the mere fact that they utilize "sense-
enhancing" tools or instruments to help them detect illegal items.
89
For instance, the Ninth Circuit has held that an officer's use of a
flashlight to look into a car at night does not constitute a search.90
The Fourth Circuit has similarly concluded that the use of binoculars
to observe illicit activity does not turn the observation into a search.9'
82. See supra text accompanying notes 46-57; United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) ("[G]overnmental conduct that can reveal whether a
substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no
legitimate privacy interest.").
83. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411-12 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing several examples of false positives).
84. Id. at 411-13.
85. Id. at 413.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
87. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfro, 475 F.Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
(describing false alerts that led to strip searches of students for drugs).
88. See supra text accompanying note 79.
89. United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 462 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975).
90. See United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1974).
91. See United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir. 1983).
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However, unlike the aforementioned instances, the present case
differs in that the police officers' senses were not enhanced. A dog's
more sensitive nose replaced-rather than enhanced-the officers'
own senses of smell. It was the dog's action alone that alerted the
officers to the marijuana; their own sense of smell played no role in
the discovery. 92 Consequently, the notion that drug-sniffing canines
fall within the category of "sense-enhancing" tools should be
dismissed.
3. The Marijuana in Caballes' Trunk
Does Not Fall Within a "Plain Smell" Exception
For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court
has held that a search occurs where the government infringes upon
an individual's subjective expectation of privacy that society
considers to be reasonable. 93 Granted, cars generally invite a lower
expectation of privacy because of their public nature. 94 The public
can easily see an automobile's passengers and contents as it travels
on roads and highways.95 Although cars may deserve less privacy
protection due to their use in public, the Court has nevertheless
92. Judge Mansfield makes this very argument in United States v.
Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J., concurring). In his
concurring opinion, Judge Mansfield compares drug-detecting dog sniffs to the
use of hidden microphones in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 464. In Katz, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
the Government performed a Fourth Amendment search when it attached
microphones to the outside of a public telephone booth in order to hear sounds
that would otherwise be inaudible to the human ear. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
Judge Mansfield also refers to United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 802-
03 (2d Cir. 1974), in which the Second Circuit held that the use of an X-ray
machine to detect the presence of a knife or pistol inside a closed area
constitutes a search. He points out that the X-ray machine and the drug-
detecting canine are both "non-human means of detecting the contents of a
closed area without physically entering into it" and "without the enhancement
of human senses." Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 464.
93. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
94. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1739, 1756 (2000).
95. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1986) (citing Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
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accorded some degree of protection to the trunk.96 This makes sense
given its concealed nature. The trunk is an area of the vehicle set
apart from the rest of the car and it contains a separate locking
mechanism. Moreover, unlike a vehicle's passenger compartments,
the contents of a closed trunk are not readily visible through a
window. Arguably, a person may choose to place items in the trunk
as opposed to the backseat of a car, reasonably expecting to shield
those items from the public eye. When an individual conceals his
possessions in this manner, it would be reasonable to conclude that
he does so with some expectation of privacy.
97
96. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 n.4 (1981)
(exempting the trunk from the Court's discussion of areas within the car that an
officer may search as incident to a lawful arrest). Belton involved a search of
an automobile incident to an arrest. Id. at 456. The Court prefaced its opinion
by stating that a search of the arrestee incident to a lawful arrest does not
require a warrant. Id. at 457. The issue, however, was whether such
warrantless searches also extended to the interior of the arrestee's automobile.
Id. at 459. The Court looked to an earlier decision, Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969), which stated that the officer must limit the warrantless search
to the area within the "immediate control" of the arrestee. Id. at 763.
Interpreting Chimel, the Belton Court ultimately held that once a police officer
has made a lawful arrest of an automobile's occupant, he or she may search the
passenger compartment of the vehicle as well as any containers found therein.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. The Court deemed such a rule necessary since the
arrestee may otherwise be able "to grab a weapon or evidentiary item[s]"
relating to criminal conduct within the passenger compartment. Id. at 460-61.
It is possible that this dual rationale of disarming arrestees and preserving
evidence justified the Court's decision to exclude the car trunk, since it is
unlikely that the arrestee will be able to reach into the trunk without the
officer's knowledge. Absent this risk, the Court chose to exclude the car trunk
from the areas which officers were at liberty to search. Belton, 453 U.S. at
460-61 n.4. Illinois v. Caballes does not involve a search incident to a lawful
arrest. Nevertheless, the justification the Court provided for including only the
automobile's passenger compartment in Belton may arguably apply even in the
case of a traffic stop.
97. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 416 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting).
One could compare this to California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988), in
which the Court stated that even assuming that the defendant had a subjective
expectation of privacy in garbage he placed for pick up in front of his house,
such an expectation was not one that society was prepared to find reasonable.
The Court noted that the garbage was easily accessible to animals, scavengers,
and other members of the public. Id. at 40.
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By contrast, when an individual leaves an object out in the open,
an officer does not conduct a search of the item when he observes
it.98 The rationale is that by leaving the object in "plain view," the
owner exhibits "no intention to keep [it] to himself."99  This
reasoning also takes form in a "plain smell" doctrine, which states
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy and thus no search
where officers detect odors emanating from enclosed spaces.
100
Thus, one may argue that the smell of marijuana coming from
Caballes' trunk falls within the "plain smell" doctrine and thereby
escapes scrutiny. Such an argument, however, requires too great a
stretch in reasoning to be feasible. In the instant case, the officers
did not detect the odors emanating from Caballes' trunk with their
own nostrils. Rather, any detection of smell was done vicariously
through the use of a trained drug-detecting canine. In order to apply
the "plain smell" doctrine to the instant case, one would have to
impute a dog's sense of smell to a human being."01 The Ninth
Circuit addressed the issue of smell in Hernandez v. United States,'
0 2
in which police officers detected the odor of marijuana from
suitcases only after pressing the suitcases' sides together and forcing
air out from the inside. 0 3 The court characterized this action as an
"exploratory investigation" and concluded that it constituted a
search.104 The officers in Hernandez were not able to detect the
smell until they took further action.
10 5
98. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 416 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
99. Id. (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
100. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.2, at 454 (West's Criminal Practice Series 4th ed.
2004) ("[T]here is no 'reasonable expectation of privacy' from lawfully
positioned agents 'with inquisitive nostrils."').
101. The difference between a human being's sense of smell and that of a
drug-detecting canine cannot be taken lightly. See, e.g., Brief of the Nat'l
Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at
13, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923) ("A trained canine's
sense of smell is many orders of magnitude more powerful than that of any
police officer.").
102. 353 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965).
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Likewise, in the instant case, Officers Gillette and Graham were
not passive actors who just happened to notice the smell of marijuana
wafting out of Caballes' trunk.10 6 Had they not utilized the drug-
sniffing canine, the officers would not have detected the
marijuana.' °7 Hence, one can hardly characterize the contents of
Caballes' trunk as falling within the "plain smell" doctrine.
Admittedly, a dog sniff of a car is much less intrusive than a
typical search. 10 8 For example, in performing the procedure, Officer
Graham did not subject the interior of the car to the canine sniff nor
did he rummage through Caballes' belongings. Rather, he simply
walked the dog around the exterior of the vehicle. Concededly,
when properly conducted, the dog sniff should not reveal information
other than the presence or absence of contraband. 1°9 Moreover, the
Court has pointed out that an individual lacks any reasonable
expectation of privacy in illegal contraband, 110 making the dog sniff
seem less intrusive. When police officers utilize canines, however,
they do so with the purpose of uncovering something that is not
otherwise apparent to them."' They in turn run the risk of
overstepping their boundaries, as did the officers in Hernandez."
l2
Thus, while the information that a dog sniff is designed to reveal
may be limited, by no means does this warrant complete exclusion
from Fourth Amendment scrutiny."1
3
106. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
107. See id.
108. See Brief of The Ill. Ass'n of Chiefs of Police and The Major Cities
Chiefs Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5-6, Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923).
109. Brief for the Respondent at 17, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)
(No. 03-923). This also assumes, however, that the dog sniffs are accurate. As
previously discussed, the accuracy of canine drug sniffs has in fact often been
called into question. See generally Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411-12
(Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that the canine sniff is not infallible and
sometimes reveals false positives); see supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
111. United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1984) (Pregerson,
J., dissenting) ("When using dogs to ferret out contraband, the police.., are
seeking evidence in hidden places. If this activity does not qualify as a
'search,' then I am not sure what does.").
112. See supra text accompanying notes 102-105.
113. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 109, at 17.
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B. The Supreme Court Should Have
Applied Terry v. Ohio's Reasonableness Test
Since a dog sniff does not entail the same high degree of
intrusiveness involved in a typical search, the Supreme Court
correctly decided that a dog sniff does not require probable cause.
1 14
The Court's solution to permit dog sniffs even where no suspicion
exists, however, seems too extreme. Between these two extremes,
perhaps police officers should be permitted to utilize drug-sniffing
canines upon a lower quantum of evidence than would ordinarily be
required to establish probable cause. In fact, the standard applied in
Terry v. Ohio115 should be applicable in the instant case.
1. Terry Announced a Two-Part Test
In Terry, a police officer seized three men after suspecting them
of planning a "stick-up." ' 16 Prior to the seizure, he had observed a
series of acts that he felt warranted further investigation. 1 7 The
officer also feared that the men might be armed and thus patted them
down for weapons." 8 The Supreme Court found that the pat-down
constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
19
In analyzing the reasonableness of the search and seizure, the Court
applied a two-part test: first, "whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception," and second, "whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place."' 
20
The Court utilized a balancing test to analyze the first prong. In
determining whether an officer's actions were justified and therefore
reasonable, it explained that "there is 'no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the [government's] need to
114. Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 101, at
15-16.
115. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
116. Id. at 6-7.
117. Id. (stating that the officer observed the men hovering on a particular
block for extended periods of time, looking repeatedly into a store window,
pacing alternately along one path, and meeting for conferences on the street
comer).
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id. at 19.
120. Id. at 19-20.
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search [or seize] against the invasion [of the individual's privacy]
which the search [or seizure] entails.' ' ' 12 ' The Court considered first
the "nature and extent" of governmental interests. 122 It noted that the
government had an interest in effective crime prevention, and that
consequently, police officers may be able to approach individuals
without probable cause where necessary to investigate potential
criminal behavior. 123 Another governmental interest was the police
officer's immediate need to ensure his personal safety. 124 The Court
explained that where an officer justifiably believes that the person he
is investigating may be armed and dangerous, it would be
unreasonable to deny that officer the ability to take measures as he
sees fit to neutralize the threat of physical harm to himself and to
those around him.'
25
Noting the government's interests in preventing crime and
protecting officers, the Court next considered the "nature and quality
of the intrusion on individual rights."' 6 The Court acknowledged
that while officers may sometimes be justified in conducting
searches without probable cause, one could not ignore the reality that
a search-no matter how limited-is usually an "annoying,
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience."'
' 27
Applying this balancing test, the Court in Terry concluded that
the government interest outweighed the individual interest, justifying
a standard less than probable cause in the context of "stop-and-
frisks." In particular, it reasoned that where an officer faces exigent
circumstances that call his physical safety into question, the officer
should be able to conduct a search for weapons on the basis of
reasonable suspicion. 28 An officer has reasonable suspicion if a
reasonably prudent person in the officer's situation would be
warranted in believing that his safety or that of those around him was
121. Id. at 21 (alteration in original) (quoting Camara v. S.F. Mun. Ct., 387
U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
122. Id. at 22.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 24.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 24-25.
128. Id. at 27.
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in jeopardy. 129  In determining whether the officer satisfied this
standard given the circumstances, the Court required the officer to
point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."'
1 30
The Terry Court applied this standard to the first prong-
"whether the officers' act was justified at its inception"131-by
explaining that the officer observed two men acting as if they were
contemplating a robbery. 132 Even after the officers confronted the
suspects, nothing in the suspects' conduct dispelled the officer's
initial suspicion. 133 Based on these observations, the majority ulti-
mately found that the officer was warranted in his belief that the men
under investigation were armed, and thus, he justifiably initiated the
search. 134
The Court then examined the second prong, whether the
officer's action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
justifying the search. There was no problem with scope, the Court
explained, when the officer patted down the petitioner's outer
clothing to reveal any weapons that might be hidden therein. 135 In so
doing, the officer limited his search to what was absolutely necessary
to dispel his fear that the men might be armed. 36 What the officer
did not do, observed the Court, was "conduct a general exploratory
search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find.'
137
2. The canine sniff of Caballes' trunk
is not reasonable under a Terry analysis
Although Terry involved a "stop and frisk" of a person for
weapons, the Supreme Court has applied its principles to traffic stops
as well.138  Furthermore, as Justice Ginsburg explained in her
129. Id.
130. Id. at 21. The Court further elaborated that "subjective good faith
alone" would be insufficient. Id. at 22.
131. See supra text accompanying note 120.
132. Id. at 28.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 28.
135. Id. at 29.
136. Id. at 30.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1983); Pennsylvania
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dissenting opinion, the Court has viewed routine traffic stops as
relatively comparable to Terry stops. 139 Adopting Justice Ginsburg's
approach and applying a balancing test to the present case, the dog
sniff was not justified at its inception because of the lack of
reasonable suspicion and is thus likely to fail the first prong of the
Terry analysis.14
0
In terms of necessity, the officer's interest in protecting himself
from imminent physical harm in Terry was arguably greater than any
immediate interest Officer Gillette may have had in discovering
contraband. Considering the level of intrusiveness, on the other
hand, one might point out that a physical pat-down as occurred in
Terry is admittedly much more invasive than a dog sniff.
Nonetheless, introducing a drug-detecting canine on a public
highway is still invasive and ought to be justified by the same level
of suspicion under the balancing test.14' The government certainly
has an interest in preventing drug trafficking, but one must take care
to weigh that interest against the degree of interference. Put
differently, preserving one's Fourth Amendment rights requires that
the court balance the government's concern for apprehending drug
traffickers against the individual interest in privacy.
Officers Gillette and Graham probably would also be unable to
point to "specific and articulable facts" to warrant their belief that the
dog sniff was necessary. 142 One might argue that Caballes' nervous
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (looking to Terry in determining that an
officer's actions in stopping a motorist with expired license tags and requesting
that he exit the car were reasonable).
139. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 420 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("I would apply Terry's reasonable-relation test ... to determine whether the
canine sniff impermissibly expanded the scope of the initially valid seizure of
Caballes.").
140. This comment focuses on the dog sniff as a limited search for purposes
of the Terry analysis, since it is undisputed that Officer Gillette justifiably
seized Caballes when he initiated the traffic stop. See supra text
accompanying note 37.
141. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 109, at 17 ("[B]ringing a dog
to the scene of a traffic stop singles out the stopped individual, and suggests
suspicion of drug activity.").
142. The Illinois Supreme Court refused to find that Officer Gillette's
observations about Caballes-his nervous behavior, his travel attire, the lack of
luggage, and the smell of air freshener-established a reasonable basis for
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behavior and prior arrests for marijuana distribution are grounds for
reasonable suspicion. However, it is difficult to give conclusive
weight to the previous arrests without considering the context in
which they occurred, including the circumstances of the arrests and
the time that has since elapsed. As for his uneasy demeanor, courts
have found nervous behavior relevant in determining whether
reasonable suspicion exists. 143 Nevertheless, nervousness is not an
abnormal response to an unexpected situation and as a consequence,
basing reasonable suspicion on anxious behavior is also
questionable.1 44 Officer Gillette had stopped Caballes for a traffic
violation; nothing Caballes otherwise said nor did during that
detention period would have given an individual in Gillette's
position the belief that a drug sniff was necessary.145 Consequently,
the dog sniff was not justified at its inception and the second prong
of the Terry analysis need not apply.
While Justice Ginsburg referred to the Terry two-prong test in
her Caballes dissent, 146 she appears to mischaracterize its reach. In
Terry, the Court first stated that the officer was justified in initiating
a pat-down search. 147 The Court then explained that the search was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that merited the
search in the first place. 148 By contrast, in the Caballes dissent,
Justice Ginsburg begins by observing that Gillette's seizure of
Caballes-that is, the traffic stop--was warranted at its inception.1
49
When discussing the second prong, however, she states that the dog
conducting a dog sniff. If anything, stated the court, those factors constituted
"nothing more than a vague hunch that [Caballes] may have been involved in
possible wrongdoing." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 419 n.1 (2005)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting.).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1988).
144. See, e.g., United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 2005)
("Nervousness is a common and entirely natural reaction to police
presence....").
145. Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968) ("The actions of [the suspects]
were consistent with [the officer's] hypothesis that these men were
contemplating a daylight robbery-which, it is reasonable to assume, would be
likely to involve the use of weapons .... ").
146. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 418 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28; see supra text accompanying notes 132-134.
148. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30; see supra text accompanying notes 135-137.
149. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 418 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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sniff was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
necessitated the traffic stop. Justice Ginsburg's dissent thus fails to
address whether the dog sniff was even justified in the first place.' 
50
Should the second prong apply for the sake of argument, one
might contend that once Officer Graham brought the canine to sniff
Caballes' vehicle, the seizure that was justified at its inception now
exceeded its scope. 151 Under this theory, one might note that Officer
Gillette had seized Caballes for speeding, yet the drug sniff shared no
logical relationship to the circumstances that justified that stop.
Caballes had no reason to believe, nor could he have reasonably
foreseen, that a traffic stop for speeding would also entail a canine
sniff. Officer Gillette had also specifically informed him that he
would only receive a warning ticket. In other words, the dog sniff
was not a "natural extension" of the original traffic stop. 152 In the
Court's decision in Florida v. Royer,153 Justice White stated that "an
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."'
154
This argument, however, is unlikely to succeed. In People v.
Cox, 55 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a dog-sniff of a vehicle
was unconstitutional. 156  There, an officer stopped the defendant
because the vehicle did not have a rear registration light. 57 Upon
first initiating the stop, he called another officer to conduct a canine
drug-sniff. 58 The second officer arrived at the scene fifteen minutes
150. See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 ("The scope of the search must be
'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." (emphasis added) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310
(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))).
151. This appears to be the point that Justice Ginsburg was making in her
dissent, the difference being that she did not separate "search" from "seizure"
in applying the Terry analysis. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 417-25
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152. Cf United States v. Suarez, 694 F. Supp. 926, 938 (S.D. Ga. 1988)
(additional questions posed by the officer did not constitute a second seizure
since they were a "natural extension" of the continuing traffic stop).
153. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
154. Id. at 500.
155. 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 2002).
156. Id. at 281.
157. Id. at 279.
158. Id.
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after the initial stop, while the first officer was still writing the traffic
citation.' 59  In finding the introduction of the drug-detecting dog
impermissible, the Court explained that although the first officer was
still writing the ticket when the dog arrived, nothing in the record
justified the duration of the stop. 160 Moreover, the first officer
specifically requested the canine sniff, despite having no reason to
suspect the presence of drugs.'61
However, the instant case differs in two material respects. First,
Officer Gillette did not call the narcotics-sniffing dog to the scene.162
Second, Officer Gillette was still in the process of writing the traffic
ticket when Officer Graham arrived with the dog, and the entire
incident-including the sniff-took less than ten minutes. 63 Thus,
unlike Cox, it does not appear that the officers' investigation lasted
longer than necessary to complete the purpose of the traffic stop.
Consequently, the introduction of the drug-detecting canine did not
broaden the scope of the traffic stop-at least not in terms of
duration. However, as discussed above, the drug-sniff should
nevertheless fail to pass constitutional muster under the first prong of
the Terry analysis.' 
64
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court's holding in Caballes places a dangerous
degree of power in the hands of law enforcement authorities. The
Court concluded that a canine sniff conducted during a traffic stop
did not compromise Caballes' Fourth Amendment interests. 165 This
holding begs the question of where the Court will draw the line.
That dogs have been an important tool in crime prevention
efforts certainly cannot be disputed. 66 However, after the Court's
159. Id. at 280.
160. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court also noted that there is no specific time
limit on traffic stops. Id. Nevertheless, it held that the duration of this specific
traffic stop roused suspicion. Id. (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
685 (1985)).
161. Id. at 280-81.
162. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005).
163. Id.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 140-145.
165. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
166. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Supreme Court Expands Police Search Powers:
1491
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1471
decision, these law enforcement interests may be furthered at the cost
of infringing into the private lives of citizens. If searches that are not
motivated by reasonable suspicion continue to be validated based on
the nature of the information they reveal,167 there would appear to be
no limits to conducting searches until one is able to find contraband.
Moreover, the Court's affirmation of Place may clear the way
for unfettered police discretion. In Place, the Court held that a dog
sniff does not constitute a search. 68 Hence, a dog sniff escapes the
Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness, meaning an
officer could conduct a sniff without any suspicion of wrongdoing.
This is a disturbing notion on several levels. For instance, there
has been significant debate over the prevalence of racial profiling
practices by law enforcement officers. 169 This concern stems from
reports of increased numbers of traffic stops and interrogations
aimed against drivers of color.' 70 Much of the controversy centers
around statistics that reveal heightened drug interdiction practices
involving African-American and Hispanic drivers in particular. 171 It
is worthwhile to note that, according to his own attorney, Caballes
was of Filipino descent but appeared Hispanic. 172 Though a
Drug-Sniffing Dogs Now Have Access to Any Car Stopped, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
25, 2005, at A4.
167. In Caballes, the U.S. Supreme Court did not indicate whether Officer
Gillette's actions were supported by reasonable suspicion. For an argument
that reasonable suspicion did not exist, see supra text accompanying notes
142-145.
168. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
169. See, e.g., DATA COLLECTION RES. CTR., INST. ON RACE AND JUSTICE,
HISTORY OF RACIAL PROFILING ANALYSIS, http://www.racialprofilinganalysis
.neu.edulbackground/history.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
170. Id.
171. See id. ("In some cases ... officers began targeting black and Hispanic
male drivers by stopping them for technical traffic violations as a pretext for
ascertaining whether the drivers were carrying drugs."). For a more thorough
discussion of racial profiling in the context of traffic stops, see Tracey Maclin,
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 333 (1998); Michael A.
Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544
(1997).
172. See Timothy P. O'Neill, 5 Reasons Defense Attorneys Should Be
Thankful, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 12, 2003, available at
http://www.jmls.edu/facultypubs/oneill/oneillcolumn_1203.shtml.
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discussion of racial profiling is outside the scope of this Comment,
the ongoing debate proves interesting in light of this fact.
To characterize dog sniffs as non-searches when incident to a
lawful traffic stop may also open the door to any number of different
investigations. Police officers could potentially pull an individual
over for driving five miles over the speed limit and then conduct a
canine-assisted drug sniff, brushing it off as a mere extension of the
original traffic stop so long as it was conducted within a ten-minute
time period. There is also the question of line-drawing. Should
lower courts apply the rule that a dog sniff is not a search, it leaves
open the issue of whether a dog sniff of a home-the front porch, for
example-would also escape constitutional scrutiny. The Court has
recognized that the home deserves special protection. However, if a
dog sniff is not a search, one can only worry about how much
protection the home really has.
It must still be noted that in this post-September 11 era, concerns
over terrorism and national security are important factors to consider.
Perhaps one might argue that individuals should sacrifice their
interests in privacy for a greater good. However, suspicionless drug
sniffs implicate the right of citizens to remain free from arbitrary
police interference, a right that is central to the Fourth Amendment's
protections. 173 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissenting
opinion, the Court has distinguished between a general interest in
crime control and more immediate threats to national security. 174 As
such, even if dog sniffs were to be properly considered as limited
searches, the Fourth Amendment would undoubtedly permit sniffs




In some sense, the Supreme Court's decision in Caballes comes
as no surprise. It follows the Court's line of precedent giving
deference to law enforcement authorities and government interests in
173. Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 101, at 4.
174. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 424 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 425. The special needs doctrine is an important exception carved
out for imminent dangers to national security. See Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 706 (1989). This subject however lies
beyond the scope of this Comment.
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crime control. It should, however, shock the conscience of millions
of motorists who travel our nation's highways every day. While the
government has a legitimate interest in preventing drug-crimes, with
this Court's decision, it comes at a high price-peace of mind.
Canine sniffs serve important purposes and are invaluable to
proper drug-detection procedures. However, the power to conduct
these sniffs must be subject to the Constitution's checks on
unreasonable intrusions into an individual's right of privacy. The
Fourth Amendment serves as a key deterrent function and has long
been recognized as a crucial means of discouraging unlawful police
conduct. 176  The Court's decision in Caballes, unfortunately, has
chipped away at that fundamental protection. Until the Court
recognizes the need to limit law enforcement's discretion in con-
ducting potentially intrusive investigations, the rest of us can only
wonder what our next commute will have in store.
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